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Sales Law: Feasibility of Broadening the Scope of Warranty
Protection of Third Party Beneficiaries: When the Uniform Commer-
cial Code was enacted in Wisconsin,' it made several changes in existing
Wisconsin sales law. Section 402.318 of the Wisconsin Statutes, 2 re-
garding third party beneficiaries of warranties presented a major break
with prior Wisconsin case law by changing the privity of contract rule
associated with warranties in sales contracts as announced in Prinsen
v. Russos3 in 1927.
In the Prinsen case, the plaintiff was injured by eating infected ham
in a sandwich purchased for her by another from defendant restaurant.
The trial court refused to submit the case on the theory of implied war-
ranty. The Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court, stated in its
opinion:
To assert a right, however, based upon a breach of warranty,
express or implied, it is necessary that the required elements of a
contract be present. The express language of the statute . . . in-
voked by plaintiff makes the rule there declared applicable as
between buyer and seller, and manifestly is not intended to create
a liability of seller towards any person outside of such so defined
and limited contractual relationship. . . . Unless there be privity
of contract the general rule is that there is no liability for a breach
of the contract to outsiders.4
Thus the Supreme Court limited the scope of protection afforded by
sales contract warranties to the buyer and based its decision on a privity
of contract theory.
The Supreme Court had not changed its rule in 1952 when it cited
the Prinsen case with approval in Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, Inc.5
In the Cohan case, the plaintiff had purchased a feed mixture for his
mink from defendant Associated, who had mixed the feed expressly
for that purpose. Many mink died and the cause of death was traced to
infected pork livers which middleman Associated had purchased from
Armour. Associated impleaded Armour and in an amended complaint
the plaintiff brought an action for breach of implied warranty against
Armour, claiming he had relied on Armour's skill in processing and on
its warranties relative thereto in purchasing the goods. Armour's de-
lWis. Laws 1963, ch. 158 (effective July 1, 1965).
2 WIs. STAT. 402.318 (1965): Third party beneficiaries of warranties, express
or implied. A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a
guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, con-
sume or be effected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of
the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
3 194 Wis. 142, 215 N.W. 905 (1927).
4 Id. at 145, 215 N.W. at 906.
5261 Wis. 584, 53 N.W.2d 788 (1951).
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murrer to the complaint was sustained by the trial court. On appeal
the Supreme Court affirmed, stating that in order to permit recovery
for breach of warranty by an ultimate buyer against the manufacturer,
there must be privity of contractual relations between them.
A 1959 case involving a breach of warranty claim was Smith V. Atco
Company.6 In the Smith case, the Supreme Court announced that privity
between the plaintiff and a manufacturer was no longer required in a
negligence action. The court cited by way of a footnote a Michigan
case7 which had abolished privity as a requirement for liability in both
negligent tort and breach of warranty actions. The Wisconsin court,
however, expressed its adherence to the rule announced in Prinsen with
regard to privity in a breach of warranty action. But a step had been
taken toward the breakdown of privity as a liability test, though limited
to tort actions.
A further and much more decisive step toward the abolishment of
the privity test in a breach of warranty action was taken by Wisconsin
in 1963 in Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co." In Strahlendorf, the plaintiff's
grandmother purchased a toy plane set from defendant and took it to
the home of her son. There the plaintiff's five year old brother launched
the plane and it struck plaintiff in the eye, seriously injuring her. The
plaintiff sued, alleging that the defendant had impliedly warranted that
the plane was safe for use by minors. The trial court directed a verdict
for defendant on the ground of lack of privity between plaintiff and
defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision on a different
ground. By way of dicta, the court indicated that it was cognizant of
the modern trend of decisions9 which have abolished the requirement of
privity in breach of warranty cases and the court went on to say:
When this court declared in footnote in Smith z. Atco Co. ...
that Wisconsin requires privity in breach-of-implied-warranty
cases, it was merely stating the then present status of our law.
This does not mean that this court will adhere to this rule for-
ever, regardless of the persuasiveness of the arguments made, or
the authorities cited, in favor of changing it. However, we do
not deem the instant case a proper one in which to give considera-
tion to this question.' 0
Thus, prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in
this state, the Wisconsin court did not recognize the law as stated in
6Wis. 2d 371, 94 N.W.2d 697 (1959).
7Spence v. Three Rivers Builders and Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90
N.W.2d 873 (1958).
8 16 Wis. 2d 421, 114 N.W.2d 823 (1962).
9 See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69(1960). In this case involving breach of implied warranty, the court held
privity of contract was not essential to recovery and based its conclusion on
a consideration of modern marketing practices and the complete dependence
of the buyer upon the ability of the manufacturer to make a product fit for
its represented use.
10 16 Wis. 2d at 435, 114 N.W.2d at 831.
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402.318, although it indicated that it might have reached a similar rule
if the proper case had presented itself. By adopting section 402.318 as
part of the Uniform Commercial Code, the legislature extended the
scope of protection afforded by sales contract warranties to any person
who is in the family or household of the buyer or is a guest in his home
and who could reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected
by the goods."
In its most recent decision regarding privity of contract in implied
warranty cases, Dippel v. Sciano,1 2 the court considered section 402.318
in the form enacted by the legislature. The action in Dippel was to re-
cover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in moving a large
coin-operated pool table at the request of defendant's employee. While
in the process of moving the table, the leg assembly collapsed and the
table crushed plaintiff's foot. The accident occurred on premises owned
by the defendant and prior to the enactment of the Code in Wisconsin.
The plaintiff also joined as defendants in the action the manufacturer
of the table, the sales distributor, and the lessor of the table. The plain-
tiff's third cause of action alleged breach of express and implied war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose against
the manufacturer and the sales distributor. The distributor demurred
upon the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer on
the ground of lack of privity of contract between the plaintiff-user and
the defendant-sales distributor.
Whereas the plaintiff on appeal based his action on breach of
implied warranty and sought to have the rule regarding privity of con-
tract between seller and ultimate user abrogated, the court refused to
deal with this issue, thereby rejecting its earlier dicta in Strahlendorf,
and rather viewed the issue in regard to a cause of action in strict liabil-
ity in tort. The court decided that a plaintiff who had been injured due
to a defective product would be more effectively protected by adopting
a rule of strict liability rather than under implied warranty which de-
pended upon privity. The court examined section 402.318 and decided
it was inadequate in its extension of protection to third parties as en-
acted. The court said, "The section does not substantially change the
doctrine of privity. The code, in fact, does not provide a much more
desirable basis for extension than does the Uniform Sales Act."' 3 The
court went on to say,
The abrogation of the privity requirement is not strictly and
exclusively a matter of sales and contract law. When the manu-
facturer or the seller offers a product for sale which he expects
to be used by the consuming public within its intended use and
11 Wis. ANNOT.-UCC, Sales, at 95 (1961).
1237 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
13 Id. at 454, 155 N.W.2d at 60.
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such product is defective and injures the consumer, his liability
in tort can be based upon a breach of duty quite apart from
contract obligations. In these situations the Uniform Commercial
Code is inapplicable.
We are of the opinion that the rule which requires privity of
contract in products-liability cases should not be used to defeat
a claim based upon a defective product unreasonably dangerous
to a nonprivity user. For products-liability cases we adopt the
rule of strict liability in tort as set forth in section 402 A of Re-
statement, 2 Torts (2d), pp. 347, 348.14
And in conclusion the court said,
The third cause of action of the plaintiff's complaint is
grounded upon a theory of an abolition of the rule of privity of
contract in actions for breach of implied warranty. Because we
have determined that physically injured users or consumers of
unreasonably dangerous defective products should pursue their
remedy under the rule of strict liability in tort, we conclude that
the third cause of action in the complaint does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action and the order sustaining
the demurrer should be affirmed but with leave to plead over.13
The court has thus put section 402.318 into a limbo beyond the
recall of plaintiffs due to its restricted use as now enacted. The Supreme
Court arrived at this decision probably becauses it felt the legislature
had preempted the field of implied warranty by its adoption of 402.318
and found the class of beneficiaries under the section too restrictive to
be of help in our affluent society.16 It now appears that the legislature
can redeem section 402.318 and give plaintiffs a cause of action based
on warranty by enacting one of the amendments promulgated by the
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code.
The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code,
in its report to the American Law Institute,17 stated that the primary
object of the Code was uniformity in the laws of the states which enacted
the Code and that the individual states, by making their own amend-
ments, were imperiling this object. Therefore, it became the policy of
the Permanent Board, "in attaining and maintaining uniformity," to
propose alternative amendments to the Code to facilitate the Code's ac-
ceptance.' 8 Acting under this authority, the Permanent Board has pro-
mulgated optional amendments to the Code section 402.318 in the form
of three alternatives, in order to allow states a choice as to how far to
extend the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose and yet keep uniformity in the enactments.' 9 Their adoption
14 Id. at 458-459, 155 N.W.2d at 62-63.
'15 Id. at 463, 155 N.W.2d at 65.
16 Id. at 454-455, 155 N.W.2d at 60.
17 UNIFORM COmmERCIAL CODE at viii (1962).
18 Id. at xiv.




was due to the fact that many states had enacted variations because the
section 402.318 was considered too restrictive, and there was no unanim-
ity as to the scope of warranty protection which was necessary.
The promulgation of the alternative amendments necessitates a
comparison of their differing coverage under a seller's warranty and
consideration of the advisability of an amendment to the Wisconsin
section 402.318.
Alternative A of Uniform section 2-318 is the present Wisconsin
law as embodied in 402.318. A consideration of the present statute shows
that in order for a person to be a beneficiary of the seller's warranty,
(1) he must be a member of the purchaser's family or a guest of his
household, and (2) it must be reasonable to assume that such a person
would use the goods sold. The section does not permit recovery for
damage to property of the user nor to a guest in a restaurant.2 0
Alternative B of Uniform section 2-318 reads as follows:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, con-
sume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person
by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section. 22
The significant change that alternative B makes is that it expands the
class of beneficiaries to any natural person who "may reasonably be
expected" to use, consume or be affected by the goods and thus removes
the limitation, as now embodied in 402.318, to the family, household
and guests of the purchaser. This Alternative B would modify the
Strahlendorf decision because it would bring the infant plaintiff in that
case within the class of beneficiaries.
Alternative C is quite liberal in its classification of third party ben-
eficiaries and approaches the strict liability of section 402 A of the Re-
statement of Torts. Alternative C states:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the war-
ranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to
whom the warranty extends. 22
This alternative, like B, expands the class of beneficiaries beyond
402.318. However, C, drops the word "natural" as a prefix to person
and thus allows any person, human or otherwise, to recover if it "may
reasonably be expected" to use, consume or be affected by the goods.
Alternative C also allows recovery of damage to property as well as to
20 REPORT OF THE COMMERCIAL CODE COMMITTEE TO THE WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL, Meeting of Dec. 6, 1960 at p. 15 (July, 1961).




person, as witnessed by the deletion of the words "in person" in its
damage clause.
Any consideration bf these alternatives would not be complete with-
out an analysis of section 402 A of the Restatement of Torts.23 This
section, entitled "Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical
Harm to User or Consumer," states that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ulti-
mate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it
is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.24
The rule stated in this section is strict liability and it applies even in the
absence of negligence on the part of the seller.25 It is limited to sales
by a merchant, 2 but it is not governed by the limitation imposed by the
Uniform Commercial Code on the scope and content of warranties or
by the limitation to "buyer" and "seller" in that statute; the consumer
is not required to give notice of injury within a reasonable time, as is
required in the Code,27 nor is the consumer's cause of action affected
by disclaimers or agreement between, the seller and the immediate buyer,
as is possible under the Code.28 .
Prior to the Dippel case, Wisconsin had rejected the rule stated in
section 402 A.20 This was due to the theory of implied warranty as ap-
plied to products liability cases by the Wisconsin court. 30
Thus the concept of strict liability in the field of products
liability, when predicated upon a theory of implied warranty
of fitness and/or merchantability, with a resulting breach, has
,actually proven to be a deterrent in many states rather than an
aid to strict liability. The concept of warranty has involved many
major difficulties and digadvantages that it is very questionable
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, vol. 2 at 347-348.
24 Id.
25 Id., comment a at 348.
26 Id., comment f at 350.
27 Id., comment m at 356.
28 Ibid.
29 See note 4, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, Appendix (1966).
30 See Ghiardi, The Last Word in Products Liability-Section 402-A of the Re-
statement of Torts, 6 WIscoNsIN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, 101 (1966),
in which the author traces the history of products liability in Wisconsin.
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whether it has not become a burden rather than a boon to the
courts in liberalizing liability. Wisconsin, presently implying that
it may revert to the consideration of warranty is essentially an
action in the nature of tort, will have done so when it directly
abolishes the privity requirement.
3 1
Therefore, the only obstacles that blocked section 402 A from becoming
the law in Wisconsin were recognition by the Supreme Court that war-
ranty is a matter of tort liability and failure by the court to accept the
social policies supporting strict liability in products liability cases.
As compared to the three optional amendments proposed in the
Uniform Commercial Code, Restatement section 402 A affords the con-
sumer much more protection. However, it does not rely on the warranties
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose made by the
seller, but instead on a special responsibility placed on the seller of
products to be consumed by the public. The Code deals specifically with
these warranties and attempts to afford protection to third parties while
working within the framework of the sales contract. Nevertheless,
foreseeability is a relevant factor in arriving at liability in sales. To
limit a retailer's breach of warranty to his immediate vendee or even
to his family and household is unrealistic when both the retailer and
the buyer are aware at the time of the sale of the goods that many
persons outside this group may use or come in contact with it.3-
Upon final analysis, enactment of alternative C as an amendment
to section 402.318 is desirable on the basis of sound social policy. The
purchaser of goods and parties in relation to him should be protected
to the fullest extent by the seller's warranty that the goods he sells
are menchantable and fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods
are used. The section as it now exists has been rendered useless by the
court in its ability to meet this need. If alternative C were enacted, it
would protect all buyers in their person and property from defects in
goods which have been represented to them as safe and suitable for use.
As a result, any beneficiary of a warranty could bring a direct action
against a seller for breach without any technical rules as to privity.
Also, in a warranty theory action, the plaintiff's case would not be
subject to the defense of contributory negligence as is possible under
the strict liability in tort theory adopted by the Supreme Court in the
Dippel case.3 3 Only by action of the legislature in enacting such alterna-
tive amendment can full protection be extended to ultimate consumers
of products intended for use by the general public.
JOSEPH D. MELENDES
31 Id. at 121.
"1 Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39 (1961).
3 37 Wis. 2d 443, 462, 155 N.W.2d 55, 65-66 (1967).
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